Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) fighters encroach on the capital city of Mali, Bamako, this week as government forces and Russia’s Africa Corps prove helpless to stop them. Much like Syria last year, Afghanistan in 2021, and potentially Nigeria in the near future, another Islamic fundamentalist sect with noted Al-Qaeda associations is soon set to wrestle control of a nation state away from its sitting government. All the while, millions of civilian lives are put at risk by fuel shortages and senseless slaughter. Such carnage is enough to make anyone sick.

Reuters/Abdolah Ag Mohamed

Contemporary Context

Dating back to January of 2012 with the Tuareg Rebellion in northern Mali, the Mali government has been contending with a continual jihadist insurgency. Driven initially by calls for regional ethnic Tuareg autonomy, the conflict has since spilled over into the larger fight for Islamic fundamentalist hegemony over the Sahel region of Africa.

While the initial 2012 coup was suppressed by Malian and French forces and the northern territory seized by the Tuareg rebels (which they claimed as the unrecognized African state of Azawad) was recaptured by the Mali government, tensions have festered since then. Particularly since 2017, with the formation of the Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) through the merger of three Salafi jihadist extremist sects, new life has been breathed into the security crisis in Mali. JNIM is now considered to be one of the fastest growing militant organizations in the world and one of the most heavily armed by far.

The military junta that now leads the country, headed up by Mali President and General Assimi Goïta, who came to power in a 2021 coup. The sitting Goïta government has been condemned by the international community. It has been the subject of frequent criticism by international organizations, such as the United Nations and the Economic Community of Western African States, for its authoritarian tendencies and reluctance to hold free and fair elections. Mali’s undemocratic tilt has alienated its former Western allies, primarily France, and left it with few friends abroad.

Mali President Assimi Goïta shakes hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin at a summit in Moscow on June 23, 2025 (Associated Free Press/Pavel Bednyakov).

This divide between Mali and its former democratic allies has left Russia to fill the void. Since coming to power, Goïta’s government has ousted its former French allies in the fight against JNIM and supplanted them with Russia’s Wagner Group and later the Russian Africa Corps in turn. Promised strengthened trade relations and nuclear energy cooperation in return for helping to enhance Mali’s security and sovereignty, Moscow now finds itself at war in two major theatres: the Ukraine and Mali. Despite its recent advances in Ukraine, Russia finds itself at a loss in Mali as the JNIM employ unconventional tactics to keep its enemies on their toes.

The JNIM Agenda

JNIM’s most recent bid for control of the country, which has taken on renewed vigour since its surprise attack on the Bamako International Airport last year, has consisted of a two-pronged approach: guerrilla warfare and economic blockades. By exploiting Mali’s landlocked nature and ethnic division, JNIM has, as described by researcher Héni Nsaibia, “effectively combined guerrilla warfare with a broad repertoire of tactics”. Through attacking tankers bringing fuel into Mali and kidnapping truck drivers, JNIM has brought the Mali economy to its knees. At the same time, they have cultivated close alliances with the ethnic minority Fulani and Tuareg peoples in Mali who lack representation under the status quo and are in search of alternatives.

Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’s fuel blockade has left vehicles to pile up for miles along the Mali interstate in and outside of Bamako (Associated Free Press/Issouf Sanogo).

JNIM’s fuel blockade has led to surging food prices, power cuts, forced closure of major public institutions (e.g., hospitals & schools), and foreign citizens fleeing the country. With extreme shortages of fuel, infrastructure in Mali has begun to crumble and access to crucial resources has become impossible to supply for the landlocked country. JNIM has furthermore encircled major highways leaving and entering Mali, which has cut off foreign aid. This has put Russian forces on the ground and the Mali government in a defensive position as Russia negotiates an emergency fuel supply agreement with Mali in the hope that this will help alleviate the stress of the blockade.

JNIM propaganda proliferates TikTok and highlights their claimed operational success against the Russian Africa Corps in Mali (TikTok/Az-Zallaqa Media Foundation).

JNIM propaganda and strategic messaging have increased the organization’s popularity with Mali’s rural class, such as the Fulani and Bamari people, who share legitimate frustrations with state corruption and the Goïta government’s ineptitude in providing basic welfare services. Broadcasting over Facebook, TikTok, and its own dedicated media group, the Az-Zallaqa Media Foundation, the JNIM has sold itself to the Malian people as a vox populi with a vested interest in promoting civilian welfare in the country.

The war between the Mali government, Russia, and JNIM is part of a larger multi-front conflict between JNIM and various West African nation states, most prominently Mali and Burkina Faso. Aiming to destabilize the Sahel region’s military governments in the hope of ushering in subsequent regimes more favourable to Islamic fundamentalism, JNIM has been responsible for terror attacks in Senegal and Niger, among others. This ambition has even put it in conflict with rival ISIS jihadists (i.e., the Islamic State Sahel Province). JNIM so far has proven nothing short of successful in buffeting its enemies and strengthening its position in Mali.

Conclusion

As the international community looks on in apathy, Mali teeters on the brink of collapse. The seeming inability of the more organized and better funded militaries of Mali and Russia to stamp out the JNIM insurrection highlights the problematic nature of terrorism. Unlike more conventional conflict between nation states, the Islamic fundamentalism of Al-Qaeda affiliates, like JNIM, have thrived on an atmosphere of political alienation and perceived oppression. With each military success that Russia, and France before them, has had in Mali, the Malian people have become more dissatisfied with its leaders and JNIM has become more emboldened. If the Malian government does not change strategies quickly, the Goïta regime may not see the new year.